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Abstract
The story of the Lisbon Treaty cannot be told–nor can a brief outline thereof be sketched–
without going back to the Constitutional Treaty, which represents the background to the Lisbon
Treaty and against which the Lisbon Treaty ought to be assessed. That is why the present outline
will first refer to the Constitutional Treaty, before addressing the structure and the content of the
Lisbon Treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community ("Lisbon Treaty")' on 13th December 2007 put an
end to a period of political and institutional crisis in the Euro-
pean Union which had opened in 2005, when the Treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe ("Constitutional Treaty") 2 was
rejected in two referenda by the French and Dutch voters. The
new Treaty is due to enter into force on 1st January 2009, pro-
vided that the twenty-seven signatory Member States ratify it. Six
already have.'
The story of the Lisbon Treaty cannot be told-nor can a
brief outline thereof be sketched-without going back to the
Constitutional Treaty, which represents the background to the
Lisbon Treaty and against which the Lisbon Treaty ought to be
assessed. That is why the present outline will first refer to the
Constitutional Treaty, before addressing the structure and the
content of the Lisbon Treaty.
I. THE BACKGROUND TO THE LISBON TREATY: A FAIR
ATTEMPT TO SIMPLIFY THINGS
The Constitutional Treaty-which was signed in Rome on
29th October 2004 by all the (then) twenty-five Member States of
the European Union, and which was ratified by eighteen Mem-
ber States4 but rejected in two referenda held in France and the
* Director, Legal Service, Council of the European Union.The views expressed are
the author's alone and do not commit in any way either the Council or its Legal Service.
1. Draft Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty) O.J. C 306/01 (2007) opened for signature
Dec. 13, 2007, (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
2. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ. C 310/1 (2004) [here-
inafter Constitutional Treaty].
3. At the date of writing, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, Romania, Bulgaria and France
had ratified the Treaty.
4. Including Spain and Luxemburg, which held two successful referenda, as well as
Bulgaria and Romania which joined the European Union in 2007. See EU Constitution:
Where Member States Stand, BBC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu-
rope/3954327.stm.
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Netherlands 5-had broken a new path in Treaty-revision. 6
Before being agreed upon under the usual procedure by an In-
tergovernmental Conference ("IGC"), the Constitutional Treaty
had been debated and crafted by a large gathering of represent-
atives, not only of the Member States, but also of the European
Parliament, as well as of national Parliaments:7 it was the Con-
vention model, already used to draft the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights of the European Union of 7th December 2000.
Albeit the product of a new Treaty-revision process, the
Constitutional Treaty was not less a Treaty than any other basic
treaty-from the Rome Treaties to the Single European Act,
from the Maastricht Treaty to the Amsterdam and Nice Trea-
ties-which had preceded it. However, its title referred to a con-
stitution and it contained symbols of statehood-such as the an-
them, the flag, and the motto-which certainly contributed to
make the eurosceptic wind blow and to attract criticism from
those who feared that the European integration process may
lead to a State, or even to a federal State.
Would calling the Treaty "a Constitution for Europe" have
made the European Union a State? Of course it would not. The
European Court of Justice had done so almost twenty years ear-
lier8 and nobody had protested. The Union is not a State-it
still draws its authority from the sovereign States who are its
founding and component members-and would not become
one as a result of the Constitutional Treaty. The fact that the
Union derives from the will of Member States would be spelled
out in the Treaty and the relation between the Union and its
Member States would be defined more clearly than ever before.
5. On 29 May, 2005, about 55% of the French voters pronounced against the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty; three days later, the Dutch voters against the Treaty were about
62%. See id.
6. See JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIs, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: A LEGAL ANALYsIS
(2006). Documents relating to the Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") proceed-
ings, which led to the signing of the Constitutional Treaty, can be found at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3-applications/Applications/igc (last visited Mar. 28,
2008).
7. See The European Convention, Composition, http://european-convention.eu.
int/Static.asp?lang-EN&Content=Composition (last visited May 7, 2008) (listing all par-
ticipating members).
8. The Court called the Treaty "the basic constitutional charter." See Parti 6colo-
giste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339; see aLso Draft
Agreement Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91,
[1991] E.C.R. 6079.
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Still, one cannot argue against the evocative power of
names. And the name was apparently too much to bear: the
name, probably more than the "thing," contributed to the rejec-
tion of the Treaty. Thus, with the Lisbon Treaty, Member States
reverted to the classical Treaty-revision approach.
Despite the fact that it never came into force, the Constitu-
tional Treaty deserves to go on record as a true attempt to pro-
vide an enlarged European Union with a simplified structure
and simpler procedures, as well as Institutions to make it func-
tion in a more efficient way, thus responding to the Nice Decla-
ration and the Laeken European Council mandate.9
In particular, the Constitutional Treaty had managed to:
* concentrate the existing primary law-which represents
about 3,000 pages from twenty different treaties-into
one single document of 448 articles (coming up to 200
pages, or double, with protocols), repealing the existing
basic treaties, as well as the treaties which had kept
amending them over the years; that was a considerable
simplification indeed; all the more so if one considers that
the first sixty articles of the Constitutional Treaty already
provided for an overall view of the Union's objectives and
means;10
* clearly define for the first time the system of competences
("who does what") in the Union;1"
9. One year after the Nice "Declaration on the Future of the Union," the declara-
tion on the Future of European Union called for a better division and definition of
competence in the European Union; simplification of the Union's instruments; more
democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union; and reorganization of
the Treaties possibly leading to a constitutional text in the Union. See EUROPEAN COUN-
CIL MEETING IN LAEKEN, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS 24-25 December 2001, SN 300/1/01
REV 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key-docs/laeken
concl-en.pdf. The Nice Declaration of 2000 also referred to the status to be given to
the newly adopted Charter and to the role of national parliaments. See Justice and
Home Affairs: The Charter of Fundamental Rights, Treaty of Nice: Declaration 23 on
the Future of the Union, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/unit/charte/en/declara-
tions-nice.html (last visited May 7, 2008). To pave the way for the IGC to come, while
encouraging a public debate on the future of the European Union, the European
Council had decided to convene a Convention composed of the main parties involved
in the debate on the future of the Union.
10. See Constitutional Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 1-1-1-60, OJ. C 310/1, at 11-40
(2004).
11. See id. arts. 1-11-1-18, OJ. C 310/1, at 14-18 (listing the categories of compe-
tences and defining the areas where the Union has exclusive competence, where it
shares competence with the Member States, and where it has competence to carry out
supporting, coordinating or complementary action).
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* revise the Union institutional framework to make it more
democratic and more efficient; and simplify the typology
of legal instruments and the different types of decision-
making procedures presently available;
* give treaty value to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union of 7th December 2000;12
* suppress the pillar structure, giving rise to a single entity,
the European Union.
Many of the above achievements of the Constitutional Treaty can
now be found in the Lisbon Treaty; however, that does not apply
to the simplification, given the Treaty-revision approach that
Member States had reverted to.
The Constitutional Treaty was indeed a readable text, com-
pared to the traditional amending treaties that had preceded it,
and a fair answer to the criticism often expressed in the post-
Maastricht debates about the difficulty of grasping the intricacies
of a multi-layered Treaty structure. The Constitutional Treaty's
fair and straight answer was to do away with the thousands of
pages of treaty texts which had been piling up for years, and start
anew with a single, comprehensive text of a far lesser volume.
The Constitutional Treaty embodied a fair attempt at mak-
ing things simpler and clearer; and yet, it was often criticized in
the same terms as the previous treaties had been and it ulti-
mately turned out making things more difficult. Thus, Member
States reverted to the classical Treaty-revision method: to make
a treaty amending the existing treaties.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMENDING TREATY. BACK TO
THE OLD CLASSICS
The IGC which drafted the Lisbon Treaty was carefully pre-
pared throughout the first semester of 2007, leading to the
adoption of the IGC mandate by the European Council in June
2007."3 The German Presidency made a decisive contribution to
its success; it was helped in this by the political circumstances
that appeared in 2006, after the "reflection period" which fol-
lowed the negative referenda, and notably by the commonly
12. See id. pt. II, O.J. C 310/1, at 41-54.
13. See Council of the European Union, Intergovernmental Conference 2007 Man-
date, 11218/07, POLGEN 74 [hereinafter IGC Mandate], available at http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st 1/st1 1218.enO7.pdf.
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shared objective of having a new treaty in force by the next elec-
tions of the European Parliament, scheduled for June 2009.14
This was reflected in the Berlin "Declaration on the occasion of
the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome"
of 25th March 2007.15
It was felt in particular that having a new treaty in force by
the next elections of the European Parliament might revive the
citizens' interest in the European Union and increase their par-
ticipation in the European Parliament's elections, a participa-
tion which had kept declining since the first election by direct
universal suffrage was held in 1979. Furthermore, having the ne-
gotiations on a new treaty closed before the European Parlia-
ment election in 2009 would avoid any risk of overlapping be-
tween the "constitutional" discussions and the politically sensi-
tive debate on the "mid-term review" of the financial
perspectives due to take place in 2008/2009.16 It was clear how-
ever that time was extremely short: having a new treaty in force
by 2009 could only be achieved, given the need to allow time for
Member State ratifications, by having a new treaty signed by the
end of 2007.
Since the early weeks of 2007, the preparation, and then the
adoption, of the Berlin Declaration had shown the German Pres-
idency's determination, and Chancellor Angela Merkel's per-
14. See Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 21/22 June
2007, Presidency Conclusions, Council Document 11177/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 2, at 2
(2007), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms-Data/docs/press-
Data/en/ec/94932.pdf.
15. The Declaration adopted on the occasion of the informal meeting of the
Heads of State and Government in Berlin on 24-25 March 2007 notably reads, "[W]e
are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis
before the European Parliament elections in 2009." Presidency of the European
Union, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signature of the
Treaties of Rome, pt. III (2007), http://%vw.eu2007.de/de/News/downloaddocs/
Maerz/0324-RAA/English.pdf.
16. In the framework of the overall agreement on the Financial Perspective 2007-
2013, the European Council had agreed at its meeting on 15-16 December 2005 that
"the EU should carry out a comprehensive reassessment of the financial framework,
covering both revenue and expenditure, to sustain modernisation and to enhance it, on
an ongoing basis." It had accordingly invited the Commission "to undertake a full, wide
ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of re-
sources, including the UK debate, to report in 2008/9." Council of the European
Union, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, at 32, Council Document 15915/05
CADREFIN 268 (2005), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cmsData/docs/pressdata/en/misc/87677.pdf.
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sonal commitment, towards attaining concrete results. The Pres-
idency pursued a dual objective: not only reaching an agree-
ment on the launching of an IGC to draft a new treaty, but also
reaching as detailed an agreement as possible, i.e., a sufficiently
precise mandate for the IGC so as to minimize the risk of re-
opening discussions and have the new treaty signed as quickly as
possible.
The outcome of this effort was the mandate, agreed by the
European Council during the early hours of 23rd June 2007,17
which led to the formal opening of the IGC a month later, on
23rd July 2007, and to the drafting of the amending Treaty by an
IGC group of legal experts between the end of July and the early
days of October 2007. It could then be left to the Heads of State
and government, meeting in Lisbon on 18th and 19th October,
to settle the outstanding issues and pave the way for the signing
of the Lisbon Treaty on 13th December 2007.18
The IGC which led to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty was
thus one of the shortest in the history of the European integra-
tion process. It had to be short, given the sensitive context in
which it took place and given the need to exploit the political
"window of opportunity" which had opened. But it could be
short only thanks to the extraordinarily thorough preparation
which had been previously carried out by the German presi-
dency, with the assistance of the General Secretariat and, in par-
ticular, of the Council Legal Adviser, Jean-Claude Piris. Never
before had an IGC mandate gone into such a level of detail, run-
ning to sixteen pages and including fully drafted legal texts.
Never before had IGC negotiations for Treaty revision been con-
ducted and successfully closed in such a short period of time.
As the previous amending treaties, the Lisbon Treaty pur-
ports to amend the existing treaties, which remain in force and
are to be adapted according to the new one. The Lisbon Treaty
contains two articles, plus the usual final clauses. Article 1
amends in 61 points the Treaty on European Union, 9 while Ar-
ticle 2 amends in 295 points the Treaty establishing the Euro-
17. See Council of the European Union, supra note 14, at Annex I.
18. See Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3
fo/showPage.asp?id=1314&lang=en&mode=g (last visited May 7, 2008) (presenting
documents relating to the IGC proceedings which led to the signing of the Lisbon
Treaty).
19. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 10-41 (2007).
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pean Community, which it renames "Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union."20 Both treaties will have the same legal
value. The European Union will succeed to, and replace, the
European Community, thus giving rise to a single legal entity.
Hardly more readable than the previous amending treaties,
the Lisbon Treaty needs to be considered in conjunction with
the EU and EC Treaties and with the Constitutional Treaty, of
which it largely takes the substance, as well as with the June 2007
European Council mandate. The reading is easier with a consol-
idated version of the treaties, as they result from the Lisbon
Treaty, published, for documentary purposes, in the Official
Journal of the European Union.2 1
III. THE CONTENT OF THE LISBON TREATY: PRESERVING
THE CORE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY
In substance, the main changes which the Lisbon Treaty
would introduce, once ratified, into the EU Treaty and the EC
Treaty, renamed "Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union," relate to the structure and the institutions of the EU;
they correspond to a very large extent to the changes which had
been agreed upon in 2004. Indeed, if the constitutional symbols
are left aside, the core of the Constitutional Treaty is preserved.
Thus, the Lisbon Treaty represents the new point of balance be-
tween the Member States which, having ratified the Constitu-
tional Treaty, wished to keep most, if not all, of its substance and
those which, having their public opinions in mind, could not
accept a text which looked too ambitious and preferred one
stripped of any possible constitutional flavor.
Great caution was taken, both in the drafting of the IGC
mandate and of the Treaty text, to suit the latter concerns, while
agreeing that the main innovations of 2004 would be preserved.
Accordingly, the IGC mandate:
* on the one hand, announced, from the very first lines,
that "[t] he constitutional concept ... is abandoned;" and
it specified, a few lines later, probably in order to dispel
any possible misunderstanding, that "[t]he TEU and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union will not have a
20. See id. art. 2, 0.J. C 306/01, at 42-133.
21. See Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, 0.J. C 115/01 (2008).
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constitutional character;"
'22
0 on the other hand, it clearly indicated that the innova-
tions resulting from the 2004 IGC would be introduced in
the existing Treaties, which remain in force, in accor-
dance with the usual amending technique.2 3
The same goes for the outcome of the IGC proceedings. While
preserving the substance of the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon
Treaty left all the constitutional symbols aside. Therefore, the
Treaties, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty:
* would not contain any terminology referring to a "Consti-
tution:" neither the term itself nor the denominations
"law" and "framework law" will be used, nor even the term
"Union Minister for Foreign Affairs" (replaced by "High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy") ;24
" would not mention the symbols of the Union-the flag,
the anthem, the motto, the currency and the Europe
day-as they were referred to in Article 1-8 of the Constitu-
tional Treaty; it goes without saying, however, that the
symbols will continue to be used in the future, as they are
used now and they were used in the past;
" would not include any provision affirming-as did Article
1-6 of the Constitutional Treaty-that Union law shall have
primacy over the law of the Member States; however, in a
declaration attached to its Final Act,25 the IGC recalls the
principle of primacy; furthermore and for the first time in
Treaty-revision practice, reference is made to a Council
Legal Service opinion affirming that the fact that primacy
is not mentioned in the Treaties shall not in any way
change the existence of the principle and the existing
case-law of the Court of Justice;
* would not reproduce the Charter of Fundamental Rights
22. See IGC Mandate, supra note 13, at 2-3.
23. See id. at 4.
24. See id. at 3.
25. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 256 ("The Conference recalls
that, in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have
primacy over the law of the Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said
case law."). The Declaration goes on to reproduce the opinion of the Council Legal
Service on the primacy of EC law. See European Council, Opinion of the Legal Service,
11197/07, JUR 260, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/stl I/
stl I 197.enO7.pdf.
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of the European Union of 7th December 2000;26 however,
Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union as amended
by the Lisbon Treaty would contain a cross reference to
the Charter, as adapted at Strasbourg on 12th December
2007, the day before the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and
would give it "the same legal value as the Treaties."
As for the substance, the Treaties as amended by the Lisbon
Treaty would largely reproduce the main changes agreed within
the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. This is as true for the provi-
sions on Institutions as for those on policies, with a few excep-
tions.
Concerning the institutional system, the Lisbon Treaty
would provide for:
" a new composition (the number of MEPs not to exceed
751, including the President) and larger powers for the
European Parliament, resulting both from the extension
of the scope of the codecision procedure (in future, ordi-
nary legislative procedure) and from the introduction of a
new budgetary procedure, where the Parliament would
"co-decide" with the Council on the budget;2 7
* the transformation of the European Council into an Insti-
tution and the creation of the office of President, to be
elected for a two and a half years term;
28
* a new "double majority" (States and population) voting
system for the Council, subject to qualifications which
were discussed until the late hours of the IGC negotia-
tions;29 and more majority voting (which would become
26. See IGC Mandate, supra note 13, at 9.
27. See id. at 12.
28. See id.
29. "As from 1st November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least
55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and represent-
ing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union," with the
requirement of at least four Council members to form a blocking minority. See Lisbon
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1, point 17, O.J. C 306/01, at 18. Until then, the present
qualified majority system (255 out of 345 votes cast by more than fourteen members of
the Council, with the possibility to check that this comprise more than 62% of the
population of the Union) will continue to apply. See id. Protocol on transitional provi-
sions, O.J. C 306/01, at 161. Between 1st November 2014 and 31st March 2017: a) any
member of the Council will still be able to request that a decision be taken in accor-
dance with the present qualified majority voting system; b) a "Ioannina"-like system will
be revived to allow a number of Council members smaller than the blocking minority to
request, under certain conditions, that the Council continues discussions with a view to
reaching, if possible, a satisfactory solution which also addresses their concerns. See gen-
eraly Council Decision of 29 March 1994, O.J. C 105, at 1 (1994).
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the voting rule by default);3"
" a lighter Commission which, as of 1st November 2014,
would consist of a number of members corresponding to
two thirds of the number of Member States; ' and a
strengthened role for its President; 2
* the creation of the office of the High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who
would have the "double hat" of Chair of the Foreign Af-
fairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission, and
who would be supported by a European External Action
Service; 3
* the Presidency of the Council, with the exception of the
Foreign Affairs configuration, to be held by pre-estab-
lished groups of three Member States, made up on a basis
of equal rotation, for a period of eighteen months.34
Finally, the role of national Parliaments-already acknowl-
edged by the Constitutional Treaty-has been further stressed
and enhanced by the Lisbon Treaty.3 In particular, national
Parliaments would be given the right to carry out a "subsidiarity
test" of draft legislation, which might, in certain cases, eventually
lead to block the legislation in question.
Also, concerning policies, the Lisbon Treaty largely con-
firms the innovations which were to be introduced by the Consti-
tutional Treaty. These are no major innovations, even if they
were sometimes presented as such in national ratification de-
bates: the Constitutional Treaty, for instance, did not intend-
nor does the Lisbon Treaty-to make the European Union more
liberistic an area than it presently is, or to lower the level of so-
cial protection. On the contrary, both treaties contain strength-
ened social provisions, as well as they both provide for new pow-
30. See id. art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 18.
31. See id. art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 20. Today, for instance, the Commission would
have eighteen rather then twenty-seven members.
32. See id.
33. See id. art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 21, 27.
34. See id. art. 1, O.J. C 306/01, at 19.
35. A general provision would be inserted in the Treaty on European Union to
illustrate the different ways in which national parliaments are expected to contribute-
and already do-to the good functioning of the Union, be it through the information
they receive on draft Union legislation and the possibility to check that it complies with
the principle of subsidiarity or through their participation in the revision procedures
(with the possibility to oppose, in certain cases, the adoption of the envisaged decision)
and being notified of applications for accession to the Union. See id. art. 1, O.J. C 306/
01, at 15.
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ers to make the Union's actions more effective in the fields of
environment, climate change, and energy.36
The most significant innovation is represented by the sup-
pression of the pillar structure. This could only be done, how-
ever, subject to "ring-fencing" the provisions on common for-
eign and security policy and to allowing specific exceptions in
the fields of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in crim-
inal matters. Overall, the Lisbon Treaty consolidates-as did the
Constitutional Treaty-the existing policy provisions rather than
innovating on them.
CONCLUSION
The European Parliament recently endorsed the Lisbon
Treaty.37 Six Member States, including France, have already rati-
fied, thus responding to the European Council call "for a swift
completion of national ratification processes with a view to al-
lowing entry into force of the Treaty on 1stJanuary 2009. "38 In
the meantime, work has begun to prepare Treaty implementa-
tion.
Hopefully, when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the Eu-
ropean Union will at last be out of the tunnel of political instabil-
ity it had entered all of a sudden one spring evening of 2005. It
will then be able to concentrate again on concrete things to do
and political choices to make in order to face the challenges it is
confronted with. The European Union might also start thinking
of new ways of having 260 million people-living in a Union
three times as large as the one in which the European Parlia-
ment was first elected by direct universal suffrage, thirty years
ago-still have the same dream. But that will probably involve
speaking in a new language to European citizens.
When the European Union is out of the tunnel it entered
on that spring evening of 2005, it will, in any case, have taken a
new step along the way to European integration.
36. See id. arts. 1, 2, O.J. C 306/01, at 11, 87, 88; see also Constitutional Treaty, supra
note 2, art. II, OJ. C 310/01, at 48-49, 60, 93-99, 103-05, 112.
37. See European Parliament Resolution of 20 February 2008 on the Treaty of Lis-
bon, PE 398.367. (2008) (not reported), available at http://www.europadecentraal.nl/
documents/dossiers/Europaalgemeen/Lissabon/ResolutieEP.pdf.
38. Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, 14 December
2007, Presidency Conclusions, Council Document 16616/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 3
(2007), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st16/st1 6 6 16-
re0l.en07.pdf.
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